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IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF UTAH 





Case No. 920592-CA 
Priority No. 2 
JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT 
Jurisdiction is conferred on this Court pursuant to Utah 
Code Ann. section 78-2a-3(2)(f) (1992), and Utah R. Crim. 
P. 26(2)(a), whereby a defendant in a district court criminal action 
may take an appeal to the Court of Appeals from a final judgment and 
conviction for any crime other than a first degree or capital felony, 
STATUTES AND CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS 
The pertinent parts of the following statutes and 
constitutional provisions are contained in the text of this brief or 
in Addendum A: 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-202 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-412(1)(d) 
Utah R. Evid. 403 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
i 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW 
Is it error for the initial intentions of a person to be i 
proven by what he or she did at a point later in time, and was it 
improperly prejudicial and misleading for the trial court to admit 
such after-the-fact conduct in a case where the prosecution < 
acknowledged that such evidence could [improperly] sway the jury?1 
See State v. Thurmanf 203 Utah Adv. Rep. 18, 29 n.ll (Utah 1993) 
(while "an admissibility decision is the sum of several rulings, each < 
of which may be reviewed under a separate standard[,] . . . the 
correctness standard is applied only to the trial court'& ultimate 
conclusion to admit or exclude the proffered evidence. . . . To the < 
foregoing extent, then, the statement in rState v. IRamirezr* 817 
P.2d 774 (Utah 1991),] that admissibility is always a question of law 
is correct"). < 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE AND NATURE OF THE PROCEEDINGS 
This is an appeal from a judgment and conviction for 
burglary (count I), a second degree felony, in violation of Utah 
Code Ann. § 76-6-202, and theft (count II), a third degree felony, 
in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-412(1)(d). (R 100-01). 
Following the jury's verdict, dated May 5, 1992, (R 90-92), the 
Honorable Leslie A. Lewis sentenced Mr. Benjamin Cecala to an 
1 The issue stated another way is: "did the trial judge, 
who initially held that no probative value attached to Mr. Cecala's 
use of an alias, err in inconsistently finding probativeness in 
hearsay testimony which claimed that Cecala had also used a false 
name when such an allegation, even if true, occurred at a time after 
the time at which his intent was at issue? 
- 2 -
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indeterminate term of one-to-fifteen years in the Utah State Prison 
on the first count (together with a $10,000 fine + 25% surcharge), 
and a zero-to-five year term on the second count. The terms ran 
concurrently with commitment beginning forthwith. (R 100-01). 
Following the trial court proceedings, privately obtained 
defense counsel (Mr. Steven McCaughey) moved to withdraw from the 
case. On October 27, 1992, the motion was granted and the Salt Lake 
Legal Defender Ass'n was appointed to represent Mr. Cecala on 
appeal. (R 105-11). 
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
On August 26, 1991, Johnny Torres, Reagan Bridgeforth, Clay 
Reid, and Benjamin Cecala were seen looking at a white (Ford) 
Bronco, marked with a "For Sale" sign and parked in front of Kim 
White's residence (615 North 1400 West). (R 291, 363). Johnny 
Torres testified that after a short period of time, he and one of 
the others walked up to the home to ask about the vehicle. (R 377). 
Torres knocked on the front door, received no answer, and returned 
with his companion to the area in front of the house. (R 377). 
Johnny Torres then suggested burglarizing the residence 
since no one appeared to be home. (R 365). Bridgeforth and Reid 
readily agreed to the suggestion. Benjamin Cecala, however, said he 
wanted no part of it, a position acknowledged by Johnny Torres (who 
was ultimately convicted for his involvement in the burglary). 
(R 363, 365-67, 378, 381). 
The parties dispute whether Cecala walked away at that 
time, (R 378-79), or whether he remained in front of the house. 
- 3 -
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i 
(R 295). Disagreement also exists as to whether all four persons 
had initially walked together up to the house, (R 293), or whether 
Benjamin had waited by the Bronco. (R 377-78). 
The parties do not dispute that Johnny Torres, Reagan 
Bridgeforth, and Clay Reid jumped a fence (wall) and burglarized the 
residence. (R 367, 376, 381). After obtaining approximately $500 
in cash and some property, those three individuals were seen fleeing 
from the house as the police arrived. (R 334, 340, 385). Benjamin 
Cecala was found standing in a park, talking to some women. 
(R 354). Dean Evans, the officer who arrested Mr. Cecala, admitted 
that Benjamin was not seen running away from the scene. (R 358). 
Rick Clausing, a neighbor who lived across the street from 
the White's residence, said that he watched Benjamin walk right by 
the approaching police officers (Keith Bankhead and Dean Evans), 
(R 302), and towards the nearby park. Clausing and Bankhead 
believed that Benjamin also walked towards an apartment complex and 
knocked on some doors, (R 300-02, 335), although James Hallock, an 
officer who had kept Mr. Cecala in sight for all but a few seconds, 
said he did not observe such conduct. (R 322). 
Clausing acknowledged that he viewed the activities of 
Torres, Bridgeforth, Reid, and Cecala as suspicious. All four 
individuals are Hispanic; three of them appeared to be juveniles. 
(R 289). Benjamin was seen wearing dark or black clothing. 
Clausing told his wife to call the police. (R 299). 
Unlike Johnny Torres, who knew first-hand of Benjamin's 
unwillingness to participate in the burglary, Rick Clausing based 
- 4 -
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his suspicions on what he thought he saw occurring. Clausing saw 
Benjamin turn and talk to the others every two or three minutes. 
(R 298). Cecala may have even looked around and "peeked" in the 
officer's direction. (R 330). 
Clausing confessed, however, that he did not hear Benjamin 
make any noises or sounds when the police arrived. (R 307). 
Officer Bankhead similarly said nothing about any such occurrence in 
his police report. (R 343). James Hallock, the officer who arrived 
on the scene in the same patrol car as Bankhead, remained consistent 
on this fact, making no mention of a sound in his police report or 
in his testimony at trial. (R 311-26). In apparent contradiction 
of what had actually occurred, officer Bankhead claimed for the 
first time at trial that he heard a "howl" or an "owl" sound. 
(R 332) . However, Bankhead acknowledged that he did not know who 
had made the sound and that any of the four persons could have made 
it. (R 339). 
After the other three persons were seen running from the 
scene, Torres and Reid were immediately apprehended; Bridgeforth 
escaped; and Benjamin Cecala was arrested in the park. 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
The trial court erred in admitting evidence that 
Mr. Benjamin Cecala had used a false name. Whatever Benjamin may or 
may not have been thinking at the time his friends burglarized a 
home cannot be established by what Benjamin said or did after the 
fact. 
- 5 
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i 
The jury, however, may have viewed the improperly admitted 
testimony as reflective of Mr. Cecala's intent, or his knowledge, or ^ 
his participation. In other words, the after the fact evidence may 
have misled or confused the jury when the proper focus should have 
been on what his intent was at the time the others committed the ^ 
burglary. As the prosecutor acknowledged, the testimony in question 
affected the jury's determination of Mr. Cecala's "role." 
< 
ARGUMENT 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN ADMITTING "AFTER THE FACT" 
EVIDENCE, CONDUCT WHICH HAD NO BEARING ON A PERSON'S 
INTENT "BEFOREHAND" OR "DURING" THE INCIDENT, AND 
CONDUCT WHICH MISLED THE JURY IN ITS DELIBERATION < 
Excerpted below are relevant parts of Mr. Cecala's motion 
to exclude any references to a false name: 
i 
MR. MCCAUGHEY [Counsel for Benjamin Cecala]: Your 
Honor, my understanding is the prosecution is going to 
call a witness who would testify that Mr. Cecala, when 
apprehended, gave a false name, a name that was not 
his. 
i 
I have previously mentioned to the court before we 
started this trial that I had a motion in limine which 
I wanted the court to hear. The basis of that motion 
in limine, to exclude any reference to a false name 
given by Mr. Cecala, and the basis of that was that 
it's, any probative value that that evidence had, or i 
has, is far outweighed by the prejudiciality that 
would be shown to the defendant. 
My understanding is that the court is going to deny 
that motion, at least as far as the initial false name 
that Mr. Cecala gave, but is going to sustain the ^ 
motion as to any other false names. My position is 
that the court should keep everything out, because I 
think it's under Rule 403, the prejudiciality. 
THE COURT: Everything, or everything concern[ing] the 
alleged giving of the false name? < 
- 6 -
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MR. MCCAUGHEY: Everything under the giving of the 
false name under Rule 403. 
THE COURT: Let me clarify before Mr. Jones is given 
an opportunity to respond. You brought this to my 
attention this morning in chambers. Mr. Jones was 
present as well. You did not ask for a formal hearing 
at that time. 
MR. MCCAUGHEY: That is correct. 
THE COURT: Mr. Jones, your response? 
MR. JONES: Well, Judge, I just think that the 
evidence concerning the defendant giving a false name 
is certainly consistent with the element of guilt by 
the defendant. You have a situation where the 
officers are called, some of them take off and run, 
the defendant doesn't run away, but he appears to be 
peeking around the corner. He walks away from the 
officers. 
I just think his lying to the officer about who he 
is and his identity is certainly something that the 
jury should be able to consider in the case in trying 
to determine his role, if any, in this particular 
crime. 
THE COURT: So you're saying it goes to an assessment 
of his intent? 
MR. JONES: Yes, I think so. 
THE COURT: And his participation? 
MR. JONES: And knowledge of the crime. 
THE COURT: Mr. Jones, it's my understanding from the 
side bar conference that you had alluded to three 
false names that were given to law enforcement by the 
defendant; is that correct? 
MR. JONES: Well, I'm not sure all three are false, 
but originally he gives the name of Salvador Sanchez, 
and then the officers discover that's not his name, 
and when they confront him with that he then gives 
them the name of Bennie Medina, and they come back and 
say, "That's not your name," and he finally gives them 
the name of Benjamin Cecala. So I guess there are 
three changes in his name. 
- 7 -
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THE COURT: There doesn't appear to be much question 
that the first name is not the defendant's correct 
name; is that right, Mr. McCaughey? 
MR. MCCAUGHEY: That's right. He goes by the second, 
too, because I think Medina, he uses both Medina and 
Cecala. Because his father's name is Medina but his 
mother's name is now Cecala. 
THE COURT: That appears consistent with what I would 
have ruled in any event, and now it becomes even 
clearer, and that is, Mr. Jones, I am going to allow 
you to go into the giving of a false name, to wit, the 
first name that was given. 
I am going to ask you to direct your witnesses not 
to allude to the other names having been given by the 
defendant, or referring to him in any way as aliases 
or anything else. I don't think that that is 
probative. I think the single giving of a name that 
is contrary to the accurate name is probative. 
I think that whatever prejudicial effect it has, if 
any, is far outweighed by the probative value of the 
same. I can't see any prejudicial effect, I can see a 
clear probative value to this, and particularly I 
think we're not looking at a prejudicial effect, if 
it's limited in the manner I indicated. 
Mr. Jones, I'll ask you to clearly discuss that 
over the break with your witnesses. 
MR. JONES: All right, I will. 
THE COURT: Is there anything further, Mr. McCaughey? 
MR. MCCAUGHEY: My only argument, just so the records' 
clear, I think the prejudice we have is the fact that 
a person charged with a crime and is on trial is shown 
to have lied to the police officers. And I think that 
is prejudicial. I mean the court may not think it's 
overwhelming prejudicial, but I do think some 
prejudice results from the jury hearing that he lied 
to a police officer. 
THE COURT: I think your point is well taken. What 
I'm saying is the prejudicial effect, if any, is 
outweighed by the probative value. And to the extent 
that this gets to the defendant's credibility, I think 
it becomes highly relevant and probative. So you've 
articulated yet another basis for my ruling. 
- 8 -
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But as to the the alleged aliases, they are not to 
come in. And you know, it's kind of like the old 
Groucho Marx "You Bet Your Life" show here the little 
birdie comes down. I don't want to hear it. If I see 
the bird coming down with the witness referring to 
this, I'm going to be mad. 
So talk to your witnesses and make it very clear to 
them just what they can say and just what they cannot 
say. Tell them if there's any doubt in their mind 
about what's appropriate an what is not, they're to 
stop and ask for an opportunity to confer with you, 
Mr. Jones. I don't want to run the risk of a mistrial 
at this juncture. 
(R 345-49). 
Despite the prosecutor's argument that a lie (after the 
fact to an investigating officer) goes to an assessment of "intent," 
"knowledge," and "participation," (R 346-47), the Utah Supreme Court 
has found to the contrary. In State v. Bolsinqer# 699 P.2d 1214 
(Utah 1985), the Court concluded that such after the fact conduct 
was not relevant to John Bolsinger's state of mind at the time of 
the alleged occurrence. 
In Bolsinger, the State charged John Bolsinger with the 
depraved indifference murder of Kaysie Sorensen. The two apparently 
had been drinking on the night in question and later engaged in 
consensual sexual intercourse. In an unusual variation of the act 
(the details of which are not important to the case at bar), Kaysie 
died by strangulation. 
For present purposes, however, the Bolsinger Court made an 
important distinction between what happened before or during the act 
and what occurred afterwards. After the strangulation, John 
Bolsinger "dumped the contents of [Kaysie's] purse and left the 
- 9 -
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< 
apartment with the stereo." Bolsinger, 699 P.2d at 1216. In 
addition, lf[a]t trial [Bolsinger] explained that he had lied to the * 
police in his taped confession." .Id. at 1216. Nevertheless, our 
supreme court held: 
I 
The evidence here simply does not support a finding 
of depravity in the conduct of the defendant that 
caused the death of Kaysie. The jury may well have 
been swayed by the reprehensible conduct of the 
defendant subseguent to her death. But that conduct 
is not before us for review. The evidence is * 
undisputed that Kaysie was dead when defendant rose 
from the bed. He himself covered her face with a 
sheet, a universal gesture acknowledging death. At 
that moment the conduct which subjected him to a 
charge of criminal homicide came to an end. 
Bolsinger, 699 P.2d at 1220-21 (emphasis added by the Court). 
The Court did not view Bolsinger's after the fact conduct 
or his admitted lie as probative to determining what his intent was 
at the time of the incident. Id* a t 1220-21. In fact, the Court 
held that the State had failed to prove the reguisite mens rea for 
the second degree depraved indifference murder charge.2 699 P.2d 
at 1220-21. 
2 While the Court held that there was insufficient 
evidence for the depraved indifference murder charge (mens rea not 
proven), State v. Bolsinger, 699 P.2d 1214, 1219, 1221 (Utah 1985) 
(Howe, J., joined by Durham, J.); id. (Stewart, J., concurring [on 
this point] and dissenting [in principle on the decided 
disposition]), the Court found sufficient evidence of intent for a 
manslaughter conviction. Id. at 1219 (Bolsinger "was aware of, but 
consciously disregarded, a substantial and unjustifiable 
risk . . . " ) . However, in analyzing the element of intent under 
either depraved murder or manslaughter, Bolsinger's after the fact 
conduct proved irrelevant to his mens rea at the time of the 
offense. See id. at 1215-21 (the Court did not even infer intent 
from the evidence). 
- 10 -
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Even if a false name was in fact given here by Mr. Cecala, 
such conduct was far less "reprehensible" than defendant Bolsinger's 
actions. Conduct after the fact may be challenged separately, butf 
as the Bolsinger Court determined, such conduct should not be used 
to improperly sway the jury. It is irrelevant to determining what a 
person had intended at the time of the alleged occurrence. Cf. 
State v. Talbot, 792 P.2d 489, 495 n.13 (Utah App. 1991) (another 
after the fact consideration, "flight," is an inadequate basis for 
creating an articulable suspicion for a stop"). 
Nor did the Bolsinger court view the defendant's admitted 
lies or his taking of Kaysie's property as being important to a 
credibility determination. However, the opinion did note that such 
evidence "may well have swayed" the jury. See Bolsinger, 699 P.2d 
at 1221. The inherent prejudice could not be ignored. 
Similarly, here, the prejudicial effect of the improperly 
admitted evidence is perhaps best acknowledged by the prosecutor 
himself. As the prosecutor suggested and as the trial court hinted, 
there was a reasonable likelihood that Mr. Cecala's use of a false 
name could have been used by the jury to determine his intent, his 
participation, and his knowledge in the matter (thereby confusing 
the issues and misleading the jury): 
MR. JONES [the prosecutor]: . . . I just think his 
lying to the officer about who he is and his identity 
is certainly something that the jury should be able to 
consider in the case in trying to determine his role, 
if any, in this particular crime. 
THE COURT: So you're saying it goes to an assessment 
of his intent? 
- 11 -
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i 
MR. JONES: Yes, I think so. 
THE COURT: And his participation? * 
MR. JONES: And knowledge of the crime. 
(R 346-47). 
I 
The above concessions appear ample in terms of the 
prejudicial effect that the after the fact evidence had on the 
jury. Utah R. Evid. 403. In addition, however, the evidence as a 
whole was tenuous at best. The parties do not dispute that Benjamin 
Cecala did not enter the residence. Mr. Cecala also possessed none 
of the property in question. The only issue is whether he acted as 
a "lookout" for the others. 
The neighbor, Rick Clausing, believed that Benjamin turned 
and talked to the others every two or three minutes as he stood in 
i 
front of the house. (R 298). Officer Bankhead thought he saw 
Cecala "peeking" in his direction when the officers approached. 
(R 330) . However, neither action constituted criminal conduct and 
such behavior was merely reflective of someone who had just been 
told that others were going to commit a burglary. Cf. State v. 
Trujillo, 739 P.2d 85, 89 (Utah App. 1987) (in a case where 
"suspicious" conduct did not justify a stop, this Court reasoned in 
part, "The subsequent 'nervous' conduct on the part of the [suspect] 
when approached by Officer Beesley is consistent with innocent as 
well as with criminal behavior"). 
Officer Bankhead testified for the first time at trial that 
he heard a "howl" or an "owl" sound, (R 332), although Bankhead 
- 12 -
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acknowledged that he did not know who made the sound and that any of 
the four suspects could have made it. (R 339). Curiously, though, 
in his police report officer Bankhead never mentioned such a sound, 
(R 343), and both the other officer on the scene (James Hallock, who 
arrived at the same time and in the same patrol car as Bankhead,) 
and the neighbor who lived across the street (Rick Clausing) said 
nothing about the alleged noise. (R 307, 311-26). 
In any event, even if the sound occurred, officer 
Bankhead's own testimony reflected that the State did not carry its 
burden of establishing which of the four persons, if any, made the 
noise. (R 339); In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358 (1970). 
Although Torres may have told Cecala about the burglary, 
Benjamin's actions reflected nothing more than a desire to avoid the 
police. If, as Rick Clausing believed, (R 300-02), Benjamin went 
first to the neighboring apartments (a belief not shared by officer 
Hallock despite keeping Mr. Cecala in his sight for all but a few 
seconds, [R 322]), the fact remains that thereafter Benjamin walked 
right by the approaching officers towards the park. (R 302). The 
arresting officer did not see Benjamin running or fleeing from the 
scene, but only observed him standing and talking to some women in 
the park. (R 358). Cf. Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471 
(1963) (acting surprised or avoiding the police does not amount to 
"specific and articulable facts11); State v. Talbot, 792 P.2d 489, 
494 (Utah App. 1991) (quoting McClain v. State, 408 So.2d 721, 722 
(Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1982) (Defendant's "behavior which, taken for 
- 13 -
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its most insidious implications, indicated only that he wanted to 
avoid police, and could not give rise to a reasonable suspicion that ( 
he was engaged in criminal activity")); Talbot, 792 P.2d at 489 
(flight is an inadequate basis for creating a reasonable 
suspicion). ( 
Benjamin Cecala may have known what was about to occur but 
the evidence as a whole revealed nothing more than his initial 
association with the other three individuals. But see State v. < 
Munsen, 821 P.2d 13, 15 (Utah App. 1991) ("The mere fact that [a 
suspect] was with [another] does not necessarily conjoin her actions 
with his"); State v. Salasf 830 P.2d 1386 (Utah App. 1991). While \ 
the four persons may have associated initially together in front of 
the house, Benjamin Cecala's conduct after being told about the 
burglary reflected his desire not to be involved; he was nervous ( 
because of what he had been told; and he was simply unwilling to 
converse with the police. Under the present circumstances, the 
improperly admitted evidence cannot be considered harmless. I 
CONCLUSION 
Mr. Benjamin Cecala respectfully requests that this Court 
( 
reverse his conviction and remand the case for a new trial. 
SUBMITTED this itf day of May, 1993. 
RONALD S. FPJINO 
Attorney for Defendant/Appellant 
- 14 -
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•~ treble damages against receiver of stolen prop-
erty. 
(1) Theft of property and services as provided in this chapter shall be pun-
ishable: 
(a) as a felony of the second degree if the: 
(i) value of the property or services exceeds $1,000; 
(ii) property stolen is a firearm or an operable motor vehicle; 
(iii) actor is armed with a deadly weapon at the time of the theft; 
or 
(iv) property is stolen from the person of another; 
(b) as a felony of the third degree if the: 
(i) value of the property or services is more than $250 but not more 
than $1,000; 
(ii) actor has been twice before convicted of theft, any robbery, or 
any burglary with intent to commit theft; or 
(iii) property taken is a stallion, mare, colt, gelding, cow, heifer, 
steer, ox, bull, calf, sheep, goat, mule, jack, jenny, swine, or poultry; 
(c) as a class A misdemeanor if the value of the property stolen was 
more than $100 but does not exceed $250; or 
(d) as a class B misdemeanor if the value of the property stolen was 
$100 or less. 
76-6-202. Burglary-
(1) A person is guilty of burglary if he enters or remains unlawfully in a 
building or any portion of a building with intent to commit a felony or theft or 
commit an assault on any person. 
(2) Burglary is a felony of the third degree unless it was committed in a 
dwelling, in which event it is a felony of the second degree. 
Rule 403. Exclusion of relevant evidence on grounds of 
prejudice, confusion, or waste of time. 
Although relevant, evidence may be excluded if its probative value, is> sub-
sta^SS?ygoutweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice>. <«*»»» * * £ » 
sues or misleacling the jury, or by considerations of undue delay, waste ot 
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